The second lesson [of the financial crisis in Asia] is that transparency and free trade are more necessary than ever. . . . Rigging the markets-through corruption or denying them transparency-can only bring short-term relief. The markets always know, and they impose a heavy penalty. The discipline of the market is not always welcome, but it is a powerful ally of truth, efficiency and transparency." Robin Cook, British foreign secretary, May 15, 1998. 1 The recent call for transparency is the latest in a series of policy prescriptions which insist that the solution to our international financial ills is more and better information.
In its simplest form, ambiguity is caused by insufficient information. This first form is a technical ambiguity for which one can develop functionalist solutions of the kind proposed by institutionalist economists: more information, more precise information, more transparent institutions. Ambiguities may also be produced when there is more than one explanation, definition or model for a given economic problem: the optimal level of inflation, for example, while often taken by orthodox economists as a given (zero, or as close to it as one can get), is in fact subject to considerable disagreement-and has changed historically. 3 Moreover, the impact of a given level of inflation is experienced very differently by the wealthy and the poor. 4 The optimal level of inflation is thus essentially contested-there exists a multiplicity of overlapping definitions, each of which depends on a particular point of view; 5 this second kind of contested ambiguity cannot be resolved technically, simply by providing more information, but must instead be resolved politically.
This second form of ambiguity, however, implicitly rests upon a third formintersubjective ambiguity. Debates over economic explanations do not rest only upon different objective interests; in many cases they represent different beliefs about the way in which the economy can and should function. Such beliefs form the basis of the shifting forces of market confidence, providing the lenses through which market participants interpret economic events. While investors' perceptions are derived from economic "fundamentals" such as interest rates or inflation levels, they are filtered through a particular set of norms which distinguish good from bad economic practice. These norms are often based on concepts which are both open and complex: the freedom of the market, for example, is a principle which is not entirely reducible to a set of discrete policies.
The act of interpretation-whether performed by an investor, policymaker or scholarthus plays a crucial role in shaping the international financial realm. 6 This intersubjective dimension to economic interaction represents a third form of ambiguity.
None of these forms of ambiguity is inherently constructive or destructive to regime stability. Some forms of institutional ambiguity can be stabilizing, facilitating agreement and adaptation; others may be destabilizing, precipitating volatile changes in market confidence. Their effects depend on the way in which they are managed. All systems of financial governance must therefore find ways of accommodating and controlling these political-economic ambiguities. Yet, this analysis suggests that not all regimes will be equally successful in doing so. The most effective regimes will recognize all three forms of ambiguity and respond accordingly-reducing informational ambiguities, providing a means for negotiating contested ambiguities and building the shared norms needed to stabilize intersubjective ambiguities. The least successful regimes will be those which underestimate the force of ambiguity, treating it as a purely technical problem which can be eliminated once and for all-rather than managed on an ongoing basis.
Economic theory and financial governance
I have suggested that financial governance is in part a process of managing ambiguities; how a regime manages ambiguities depends in part on how it defines them.
Different financial institutions and ideas have historically defined and managed those ambiguities very differently.
Classical theory and the gold standard
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries international finance was governed by a gold standard regime. Countries pegged their currencies to gold at a particular rate and allowed the free movement of gold across their borders for the settlement of international debts. This was the ultimate laissez-faire system, in which states had little control over the movement of gold, and thus of capital, in or out of their economies. This financial regime was inspired by the tenets of classical economic theory, which assumed that, when left to its own devices, the market was essentially self-equilibrating. Together, the Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics and the Efficient Markets
Hypothesis predict that an unregulated market will produce the most efficient and socially optimal allocation of resources. The Fundamental Theorem states that, given the usual long list of assumptions, competitive markets will produce Pareto-optimal equilibria, ensuring that the rising tide of an economy will lift all boats. 8 The Efficient
Markets Hypothesis, on the other hand, states that competitive markets gather and use information efficiently. This ensures that market prices accurately reflect the "true state"
of the economy, allowing rational agents to make the best possible decisions. According to these two theories, therefore, free markets are both true and good, remaining unburdened by either moral or interpretive ambiguities.
Keynesian theory and the post-war regime
The gold standard was suspended during the First World War and staggered through the difficult interwar years until Britain suspended convertibility in 1931. As the Second
World War drew to a close, those seeking to develop a new post-war international monetary system overwhelmingly rejected the gold standard system, arguing that the speculative capital movements which the regime had facilitated were in fact disequilibrating-not self-equilibrating-and had contributed to the instabilities which precipitated the Great Depression and Second World War. John Maynard Keynes, one of the architects of the postwar order, argued that this speculative dynamic was driven by intersubjective nature of investment decisions and the destabilizing role of expectations.
Left to its own devices, he argued, the market was prone to volatile shifts in confidence because of the self-fulfilling dynamic of expectations: "We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be." 9 Keynes thus disputed the two central postulates of the classical theorists: if all investment driven by volatile and often inaccurate expectations, as he suggested, market prices may not reflect economic reality, and any equilibrium arrived at without government intervention may in fact be far from optimal, as it was during the Great Depression. The solution he proposed, which was at least partly implemented through the institutions of the Bretton Woods regime, was government management of investment, sustained by an international economic order in which capital movements were constrained by government and international institutional practices.
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New-classical theory and the liberalization of finance
This approach to international financial governance was dealt severe blows by the stagflation of the 1970s, and has come to be replaced by a far more orthodox set of economic ideas and policies. In challenging Keynesian theory, new-classical economists 11 developed an alternative theory of economic expectations, initiating what has been called the "rational expectations counter-revolution." 12 These theorists argued that Keynes was right to focus on expectations -but wrong to focus on their inaccuracy.
If we accept that economic agents are rational, they argued, then why do we ascribe them irrational expectations? It is irrational for people to continue making inaccurate predictions; eventually they will converge towards a correct model of the economy.
The rational expectations hypothesis paints a picture of a market economy which inevitably tends towards an optimal and efficient equilibrium-as long as it remains undistorted by outside intervention. This is a classic recipe for limiting the role of the state, and has served as a crucial theoretical justification for the progressive deregulation of international finance. 13 The rational expectations hypothesis predicts that any government which seeks to stray from the "correct" model of the economy-by, for example, pursuing an expansionary fiscal policy-is doomed to failure, since rational economic agents will "know" that this action will be inflationary (based on the newclassical model) and will therefore build inflation into their expectations, thus producing the very inflation that they fear and obviating the positive effects of the government policy. The market is always right, while government is frequently wrong.
The rational expectations revolution points towards the possibility of an unambiguous economic universe-a feat that it can only achieve by assuming away every kind of political economic ambiguity. Technical ambiguities are brushed aside in the assumption of costless information necessary for economic agents to maintain an accurate model of the economy. That model, moreover, must be singular; it cannot be complicated by the kind of ambiguity produced through multiple, conflicting economic models. Finally, while the new-classical emphasis on expectations recognizes the intersubjective nature of human economic interaction, it cannot leave any room for the ambiguity of mutual interpretation.
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This new-classical literature seems to hint at the end of history in its vision of a world where politics and policy can be finally separated and the world economy will finally work as it should. Such hopes are evident in many contemporary strategies for international financial governance, which treat ambiguity as a temporary aberrationmore often than not caused by political interference-which can be resolved by giving the market free reign. Yet the fragility of these hopes, balanced as they are on a set of rather tenuous assumptions, is also evident in the growing instability of contemporary financial patterns.
International financial liberalization
We can see the principles of new-classical theory at work in three central trends in the liberalization of finance: the liberalization of capital movements, the increasing influence of speculation on exchange rates, and the privatization of risk. These policies have brought with them new tools for managing ambiguities at the same time as they have generated their own challenges for financial governance.
Liberalizing capital flows: quarantining politics
Why liberalize? The immediate goal of financial liberalization is to allow capital to move freely across national boundaries, which it certainly has been doing, with daily foreign exchange trading levels reaching $1260 billion by 1995, seventy times the level of world trade. 15 Following the Fundamental Theorem and Efficient Markets Hypothesis, advocates of capital liberalization argue that free capital movement will produce a more efficient global economy: it will result in a more productive allocation of investment, with capital moving to the best opportunities regardless of national boundaries-most likely from developed to emerging markets-and it will provide healthy discipline for government policy. 16 Implicit in these arguments for the advantages of liberalization is a particular set of assumptions about the problem of ambiguity: first, that it is only by removing the boundaries created by states and their governments that the economy will reach a global equilibrium (thus separating politics from economics), and second, that the newly freed global market will then work to curb the interference of government by punishing inappropriate behaviour (thus subordinating politics to economics). The process of liberalizing global capital movements is thus seen as a means to the end of creating a more perfect, less political and thus less ambiguous, global financial system.
Has the experience of more liberal capital markets borne out these expectations? In a discussion paper for the United Nations Development Programme, John Eatwell suggests that the evidence is far less encouraging: in spite of the massive gross flows of capital, net flows have been relatively small, with the majority of investment flows moving towards developed countries, while the only real flow into emerging markets has remained volatile. 17 Overall, the long-term global effect of financial liberalization has been deflationary, slowing rather than increasing levels of investment and growth. 18 It has also been destabilizing, contributing to significant crises in both developed and developing countries, as speculative capital movements both inward and outward have distorted and damaged economies.
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Floating and fixed exchange rate regimes: volatility and market discipline
The liberalization of capital movements has placed exchange rate regimes under considerable pressure: the more capital available for currency speculation, the more difficult it is for states to maintain a stable exchange rate. Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange rate regime in the early 1970s, there has been a gradual movement in two directions: many larger developed economies have moved towards floating exchange rates, while many developing economies have opted for fixed rates. In spite of their considerable differences, both regimes continue to be subject to considerable speculative pressure.
As its name suggests, a floating exchange rate regime is one which allows a currency's value to float at whatever rate the market will bear; if there is great demand for a currency, its value will rise; if there is little demand, its value will decline. Before the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime, there had been considerable debate about the effects of a floating exchange rate system. Some pointed towards the troubled inter-war years as an indication of the instability of a floating system. 20 Others argued that a flexible rate system would actually be stabilizing, as the market would set the value of a currency according to an economy's soundness. 21 In the end, floating exchange rates have in fact proven to be unusually volatile, while the patterns of their movement strongly suggest that speculative pressures have been the dominant force in their determination. 22 Both the day to day volatility and the more persistent misalignments which come with a floating exchange rate policy can pose real problems for affected countries. 23 A government that pursues a fixed exchange rate, on the other hand, generally sets that currency at a particular value relative to a powerful currency, such as the US dollar.
In doing so, it commits itself to maintain that exchange rate, either by buying up or selling off its currency to maintain its price level, or by taking any fiscal or monetary steps necessary to regain market confidence. If demand for a currency drops, for example, a state might either buy up the unwanted currency, expending its own foreign currency reserves in the process, or it might raise interest rates in order to attract foreign capital. Of course, both actions have costs attached. If the demand for that currency doesn't rebound quickly enough, a state's reserves can be depleted. On the other hand, raising interest rates will tend to exert a deflationary pressure on the economy, eventually increasing unemployment. If either measure is taken too far, it can actually have the opposite effect than intended, as the market loses confidence in a government's ability to continue defending its currency in the first case, and in its willingness to force its economy into recession in the second.
These pressures can become particularly destabilizing in the context of a liberalized financial market. As financial markets have grown, they have been able to bring larger and larger sums of money to their speculative pursuits-enough that they can ultimately deplete virtually any state's reserves if they try hard enough. If the market loses faith in a country's willingness to sustain its exchange rate, it can actually force the very change that it fears, by selling the currency so relentlessly that it forces a devaluation. Thus, while a government may chose a fixed exchange rate policy in the hopes of reducing the destabilizing effects of exchange rate fluctuations, it is nonetheless far from immune from the pressures of financial markets. When driven by speculation, these markets may set the value of a currency at a rate that bears little resemblance to anything other than investors' own self-fulfilling hopes or fears. These intersubjective dynamics thus contribute to a profound kind of ambiguity where financial and "fundamental" valuations of an economy's health are at odds with one another. While such slippages may be creatively exploited by state policymakers when the market is more optimistic than warranted, such self-fulfilling expectations can be devastating once the market loses confidence.
Privatizing risk, producing ambiguity
We are also witnessing a process which John Eatwell has described as "the privatization of risk," as ever new financial instruments are developed to help investors cope with the increasing uncertainties of a world of liberalized capital and volatile exchange rates. 24 Derivatives, as these new instruments are generically called, derive their value from that of an underlying reference security; for example, they may involve an option to buy or sell a particular security before a set date at an agreed exchange rate.
Derivatives enable investors to "hedge" against potential changes in international markets such as a sudden shift in currency, equity or interest rate values. Much like hedging a bet, an investor can reduce the risk of a particular investment by making a counterbalancing investment. 25 Derivatives in general and hedge funds in particular have since come in for considerable critical scrutiny, after the failure and expensive rescue of the Long-Term Capital Management hedge fund in 1998. 26 Why this concern with a set of instruments designed to manage risk, and thus to contain some of the technical ambiguities which have been introduced by the process of liberalization? For one thing, while derivatives may reduce the risks taken by an individual investor, they cannot reduce the overall level of risk in the financial system but instead, in the words of an IMF report, can "only transform and re-allocate risk."
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Moreover, these new instruments have greatly increased the number of opportunities for speculation, allowing investors to profit from small changes in the relative prices of certain securities or to make large bets on the likely direction of macroeconomic conditions. While derivatives thus feed into the general increase in speculative trading, they also pose their own particular challenges to international financial stability.
Derivatives create complex linkages between market segments, and can precipitate spillover effects from one market into another. 28 At the same time, derivatives can increase overall market volatility by exaggerating the changes in the underlying securities upon which derivative contracts are based. 29 Given the enormous size of some hedge funds, they are particularly capable of self-fulfilling behaviours, as they sell short on a currency thus precipitating the decline that they have betted on. The intersubjective logic of derivatives speculation thus creates new ambiguities at the very same time as it seeks to resolve others.
Together, the liberalization of capital, the speculative pressure on exchange rates, and the proliferation of derivatives reveal a significant shift in the governance of political economic ambiguity towards a strategy which seeks to limit the role of governmental discretion by turning control over to financial markets. Such policies assume that economics is fundamentally unambiguous, and only becomes prone to ambiguity when subject to political decision-making. Yet as this discussion has revealed, these policies are also producing their own ambiguities, whether in the form of volatile capital and exchange rate movements, unquantifiable risk, or self-fulfilling speculative panics. In each case, these new ambiguities bear considerable resemblances to the intersubjective ambiguities for which Keynes blamed much of the Great Depression. The failure of neoliberal theory and practice to come to terms with intersubjective ambiguity has thus rendered the international monetary system particularly vulnerable to instability and, as we will see in the case of Asia, to crisis.
The Asian financial crisis
The Asian crisis began with a speculative attack on the Thai bhat in May of 1997 and rapidly spread throughout the region, hitting South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, and eventually contaminating even the strongholds of Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore. 30 The crisis came at a time when the momentum of liberalization seemed unstoppable and the euphoria of globalization incontestable. Suddenly, what had been obvious to so many proved far less certain; what had been secure, surprisingly fragile.
To understand the Asian crisis, we must place it within the context of the global movement towards financial liberalization. In doing so, we are able to see each of the various aspects of liberalization at work: the liberalization of capital markets ultimately proved destabilizing as it limited the government's ability to regulate speculative investment. The prevalence of derivatives increased the volatility of capital movements while impairing the ability of regulators to assess the level of risk. Asian governments' attempts to either fix or float their exchange rates both proved disastrous in the face of market panic. In each case, neoliberal financial policies ultimately proved destabilizingas did the IMF's attempts to respond to the crisis in those terms.
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the Asian economies had followed the global trend, liberalizing both domestic and international capital, a move which accelerated the already considerable flow of foreign investment into these booming economies. Yet these inflows proved exceedingly volatile, as once eager investors rushed to pull out across the region at the first sign of trouble; Asian economies suffered enormously as a net inflow of $93 billion to the region in 1996 turned into a net outflow of $12 billion in 1997. on the bhat, following the release of economic news which fueled already existing fears that the Thai economy's bubble was about to burst. 34 The markets concluded that the Thai government would be unable to maintain the bhat's peg to the dollar and began to sell both the currency and stocks denominated in bhat. The violence of financial markets' response to the building crisis was exacerbated by the extensive use of derivatives contracts to provide lending in Asia; in Thailand, a majority of the short-term bank funds that entered the economy were linked to derivatives contracts of one form or another, making currency and asset markets particularly vulnerable to one another's crises. The IMF quickly entered the picture at this point, but its actions ultimately proved counter-productive. In August, a $17 billion IMF bailout package was finalized; the package required the Thai government to reduce government spending, raise taxes, reduce public support for ailing firms and banks and remove the capital controls that it had imposed at the beginning of the crisis. The IMF thus responded to the Thai crisis as if it had been caused by the usual macroeconomic problems-when, in fact, this was not a classic fundamentals-driven currency crisis. In doing so, it not only implemented a "cure" which didn't match the disease, but it also reinforced investors' fears that the crisis was severe and structural. The high interest rates that the Fund demanded both depressed domestic economic activity and failed to regain international investor confidence, only reinforcing the perception among investors that the economy was in trouble. By diagnosing the crisis in the terms that it did, the Fund further spooked investors, effectively transforming a short-term crisis of liquidity into a long-term crisis of insolvency, condemning the Thai economy to long years of hardship and recovery.
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The Asian crisis provides us with a microcosm within which we can see the various forces of liberalization at work-and witness the potential dangers which attend their unchecked progress. The crisis also provides us with a powerful lesson on the perils of ignoring intersubjective ambiguity and treating a crisis in purely technical terms. The logic which shaped both the boom and the bust of these economies was driven by mutually fulfilling hopes, fears and expectations; as the IMF belatedly discovered, what one says about a crisis can be as important as what one does. This evidence reveals that intersubjective ambiguities matter, and that they cannot be effectively managed by a system of governance which assumes that they do not exist. Not surprisingly, the Asian crisis has been interpreted by some as a significant challenge to the neoliberal insistence on liberalization for all. Yet some of the most influential responses to the crisis have resisted such challenges, and have sought to find in the lessons of the crisis a new solution to global economic instability-financial transparency.
The politics of transparency
Rather than accepting the arguments of those who blamed the crisis on the instabilities created by excessive liberalization, many analysts insist instead that the problem was one of too little rather than too much liberalization. These scholars and policymakers argue that these Asian economies never fully embraced the goals of liberalization, but instead remained too committed to the "Asian model" of capitalism which relies on substantial state involvement in the economy and strong state-society ties. 38 Such analysts charge that the financial crisis was an inevitable, if excessive, reaction by international financial markets to longstanding structural weaknesses in the Asian economies-including a pervasive lack of economic transparency. 39 There just wasn't enough information available about the health of these economies-about the riskiness of bank investments, the indebtedness of corporations, or the likely policy response of government, they argue. This lack of information, moreover, was a direct product of the form of Asian economic relations: the close ties between governments and corporations obscured certain economic decisions from view, while the heavy reliance of firms on bank borrowing rather than share offerings increased the subjectivity of credit decisions. 40 By focusing on transparency, analysts both effectively deflect responsibility for the Asian crisis from the international system onto individual states, and characterize the response of international institutions such as the IMF as a call for political and economic openness.
We can also understand the current emphasis on transparency as part of the ongoing neoliberal attempt to define and contain political-economic ambiguity. while the word suggests a lack of mediation-simply opening certain areas to the gaze of the international community-achieving transparency in fact requires considerable active intervention. To make a particular financial practice transparent, we must be able to measure and interpret it in a way that is quantifiable. For example, we might want to assess the riskiness of a particular bank's investment. What information do we include, and what do we exclude? We may find it difficult to quantify certain factors that went into that decision, particularly if it was based on a longstanding business relationship.
Because that information is difficult to render transparent, we might favour decisionmaking that avoids the kinds of discretion that attend relationship-based banking.
The demand for transparency thus feeds into the broader neoliberal effort to replace discretionary decision-making with rule-based processes. It also supports the ongoing effort of agencies such as the World Bank to encourage the securitization of international credit. 42 Once we have established such standardized practices (using, more often than not, standards derived from the Anglo-American system), we need to determine whether they have indeed been followed. The collection of information thus necessitates the development of new forms of surveillance and monitoring. In the aftermath of the Asian crisis, there were indeed calls by the G-7 among others for a "new 'architecture' to strengthen surveillance of the world monetary system."
43
This new emphasis on financial transparency is thus not so much a call for less governmental involvement in the global economy, but rather a demand for a different kind of governance. As Michel Foucault argued in some of his later writings, liberalism is a paradoxical mode of governance; its advocates insist that «on gouverne toujours trop» (we always govern too much) even as it extends its norms into new aspects of social life. 44 While Foucault was certainly not alone in his concern with the rationalizing tendency of modernity, his analysis was particularly acute in its perception of its normative force. He insisted that this liberalizing move could only succeed by defining its standards in normative terms. To be effective, the movement for economic liberalization must succeed in internalizing its standards around the world-in instilling the "spirit" of transparency, and not simply its law. In spite of its claims to rule-based neutrality, the movement to liberalize is therefore best understood in normative and discursive terms. Hence the powerfully moralistic overtones of many arguments in favour of financial transparency, and the common slippage from treating transparency as a solution to the problems of uncertainty to invoking it as a weapon against endemic secrecy and corruption. Yet when someone like Robin Cook, the British foreign secretary, links transparency, free markets and free ideas, he is not pointing to the necessarily political nature of economic practices, but is rather suggesting that political liberty must be responsive to the dictates of the market, that "powerful ally of truth, efficiency and transparency."
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This is the paradox of new-classical economic theory: while it represents itself as a solution to the problems of technical ambiguity, it in fact works on political and intersubjective levels-by making a strong normative claim to the virtues of its own mode of governance, and by working to universalize the intersubjective norms of a liberal market order. The call for a spirit of transparency is not so much an attempt to bare the economy's true face to the world, as it is an attempt to create that face the world over-to transform every individual subject into perfectly rational economic agents, and thus create the unambiguous economic universe that their models so depend on by imposing new financial norms and institutions. Anyone who has listened to US Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan's strategically ambiguous statements realizes that finance rests on a considerable measure of faith.
7
The original gold standard was based on the self-equilibrating price-specie-flow mechanism first described by David Hume. In practice, however, the gold standard depended on a significant level of 
